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REGIONALISM VERSUS MULTILA TERALISMt

The Theory of Preferential Trade Agreements:
Historical Evolution and Current Trends
By JAGDISH BHAGWATI AND .AR.VIND PANAGARIYA*
The theory of preferential trade agreements
(PfA's), or what might be described in policy
terms as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) Article XXIV sanctioned freetrade areas (FTA's) and Customs Unions
(CU's), has undergone two phases of evolution, in two very different modes, largely reflecting the contrasting policy concerns of the
time. In this paper, we trace this evolution,
offering both a historical context and an
intellectual coherence to diverse analytical
approaches.

The essential message of the Vinerian approach was that PTA's, as distinct from nondiscriminatory trade liberalization, could harm
both a member country and world welfare.
PTA's could be "trade diverting" or "trade
creating.'' These Vinerian concepts have been
reworked by many, but the essential point, reflecting the theory of the second best, remains
an important contribution.
The policy implications of the Vinerian the..:
ory, however, have been badly misunderstood
in recent discussions. In particular, it has been
proposed by Paul Wonnacott and Mark Lutz
(1989), Lawrence Summers (1991), and others
that if the countries forming a PTA are "natural trading partners,'' then the trade-creation
effects will outweigh the trade-diversion effects, making the PTA beneficial to its members. The key criterion used for defining
"natural partners" is a high initial volume of
trade among them.
But, as first argued in Panagariya ( 1995) and
elaborated with necessary theoretical nuances
in Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996), this view
is untenable, and it is easy to show that a
higher initial volume of trade can be a significant loss to a member country because of the
''tariff revenue redistribution'' between member countries that it entails. One can also construct plausible models in which the trade
diversion has no necessary relationship to the
initial volume of trade. Finally, the initial high
volume may itself be a result of preferences
rather than "natural" -as is probably true
for the United States and Mexico because
of offshore-assembly provisions, and for the
United States and Canada because of the longstanding GATT-sanctioned preferential free
trade in autos, a big-ticket item.
Following Paul Krugman (1991), Jeffrey
Frankel et al. (1995) have also argued that

I. Static Analysis: Trade Creation

and Trade Diversion

A. Viner: Cutting Tariffs Preferentially
It is well known that Jacob Viner (1950)
pioneered the static analysis of PTA's. His
analysis was prompted by policy concerns
about PTA's, tracing from the Havana Charter
for the aborted International Trade Organization (ITO). The formation of the European
Community in 1957, and of the European Free
Trade Agreement (EFTA), then gave a more
direct policy dimension to this theory and led
to important analytical insights, especially
from the work in the 1950' s of Richard
Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, Harry Johnson,
and James Meade.

· t Discussants: Douglas Irwin, University of Chicago;
Pravin Krishna, Brown University; Carsten Kowalczyk,
Tufts University.
* Department of Economics, Columbia University,
New York, NY 10027, and Department of Economics,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20740, respectively.
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lack of distance and, hence, reduced transport
costs should define beneficial natural trading
partners. But in Bhagwati and Panagariya
(1996), we show that this is also an untenable
argument: we construct an example where a
country is better off forming a PrA with a distant rather than a proximate country when
these two countries are otherwise identical.
B. Kemp-Wan-Ohyama: Necessarily
Welfare-Improving CU

83

the Kemp-W~ theorem with an added policy
instrument thrown in to achieve the targeted
degree of member-country industrialization.
D. Brecher-Bhagwati: Member-CountryWelfare Effect of Policy and Parametric
Changes in a Common Market
Alternatively, the case where there is a
common market, with full factor mobility,
has been analyzed by Richard Brecher and
Bhagwati (1981). That paper also considers
how the effect of changes-such as in the
external tariff or in technical know-how or in
capital accumulation-affects the welfare of
individual countries. This analysis is clearly
relevant to analysis of policy questions such
as the effect of a change in the Common Agricultural Policy on, say, British welfare.

While the Vinerian approach has proved to
be the most potent in theory and in policy
thinking, it violated the layman-like view,
which may be now corrupting the policy domain, that PrA's were a good thing since they
were a move toward free trade. The beauty of
the influential 1976 paper by Murray C. Kemp
and Henry Wan, anticipated by Michihiro
Ohyama (1972), was to show that one could
always construct a welfare-improving CU
among any subset of countries while the nonmembers were left at their initial welfare.
The Kemp-Wan demonstration, however,
is really a "possibility theorem." Recently,
economists such as Christopher Bliss (1994)
and T. N. Srinivasan (1995) have begun to
put structure on the analysis; Srinivasan, for
example, proceeds to compare the KempWan tariff, under alternative models, to the

Finally, with the recent interest in the theory of political economy and the desire to
analyze why PrA's are becoming popular,
the cutting-edge theory of PrA's has moved
into modeling the incentives to fonn PrA's.
The chief insight of Gene Grossman and
Elhanan Helpman (1995) and of Krishna

Article XXIV requirement that the common
external tariff of a CU should, on average, be

vides a principal motive for forming such

unchanged.

C. Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati: CU
to Minimize Cost of Industrialization
After the Treaty of Rome, many developing
countries sought (unsuccessfully, in the end)
to fonn similar FfA's or CU' s on the ground
that, given the protection against the industrialized North, they could liberalize among
themselves and reduce the cost of their industrialization, an idea that was developed independently in C. A. Cooper and B. F. Massell
(1965), Harry Johnson (1965), and Bhagwati
(1968).
Only recently has a -proper proof of this
proposition been provided by Pravin Krishna
and Bhagwati (1994) who saw that the argument could be proved simply as a version of

E. Grossman-Helpman-Krishna:
The Political-Economy-Theoretic
Analysis of PTA Formation

(1995) is to show how trade diversion pro-

PrA's.
In addition, the political-economy analysis
of PrA's has been extended to other questions.
Thus, Panagariya and Ronald Findlay (1996)
have shown how reduced protection in a PrA
can lead to incentives to raise tariffs on nonmember countries-a policy issue of importance since such raising of barriers is possible
with administered protection.
IL Dynamic Time-Path Analysis: Building
versus Stumbling Blocks

In contrast to the question of whether the
immediate (static) effect of a PrA is good, we
may ask whether the (dynamic time-path) effect of the PrA is to accelerate or decelerate
the continued reduction of trade barriers toward the goal of reducing them worldwide.

Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
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We now have the key concepts in the dynamic
time-path case of PTA's acting as "stumbling
blocks" or "building blocks" toward worldwide nondiscriminatory trade liberalization, introduced by Bhagwati (1991), just as Viner
(1950) introduced the key concepts of trade diversion and trade creation for the static analysis.

MAY 1996

World
welfare
(U)

A. Formulating the Dynamic

u~

Time-Path Question

u~

The time-path question may be formulated
analytically in two separate ways.

Analytical Question /.-Assume that the
time-path of MTN (multilateral trade negotiations) and the time-path of PTA's are
separable and do not influence each other, so
that neither hurts nor helps the other. Will the
PTA time-path then be characterized by stagnant or negligible expansion of membership;
or will there be expanding membership, with
this even turning eventually into worldwide
membership as in the WTO, thus arriving
at nondiscriminatory free trade for all? The
analysis can be extended to a comparison of
the two time-paths, ranking the efficacy of the
two methods of reducing trade barriers to
achieve the goal of worldwide free trade
for all.
Analytical Question II. -Assume instead,
as is plausible, that if both the MTN and the
PTA time-paths are embraced simultaneously,
they will interact. In particular, the policy of
undertaking PTA's will have a malign or a benign impact on the progress along the MTN
time-path.
Question I can be illustrated with the aid of
Figure l, which portrays a sample of possibilities for the time-paths. World welfare is put
on the vertical axis, and time is put on the horizontal axis. For the PTA time-paths drawn,
an upward movement along the path implies
growing membership; for the MTN timepaths, it implies nondiscriminatory lowering
-of trade barriers among the nearly worldwide
WTO membership instead. The PT A and
MTN time-paths are assumed to be independent of each other, not allowing for the PTA
time-path to either accelerate or decelerate the

0

FIGURE 1. ILLUSTRATION OF THE CONCEPTS OF PTA's AS
"BUILDING BLOCKS" AND "STUMBLING BLOCKS" FOR

NONDISCRIMINATORY TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Notes: The PTA's may improve welfare immediately from
U 0 to U; or (because of net trade diversion) reduce it to
U!. The time-path with PTA's, in either case, could be
stagnant (paths II and ill}, implying a fragmentation of the
world economy through no further expansion of the initial
trade block; or it could lead (paths I and IV) to multilateral
free trade for all at U* through continued expansion and
coagulation of PTA's. Under process-multilateralism, the
time-path may fail to reach U* and instead fall short at Um
because of free-rider problems; or it may overcome them
and reach U*. This diagram assumes that the time-paths
are independent, so that embarking on a PTA path does
not affect the process-multilateralism path. The text,
however, discusses such interdependence. (The figure is
adapted from Bhagwati [1993).)

course of MTN (thus ruling out the type of
issues in Question II). The goal can be treated
as reaching U*, the worldwide freeing of trade
barriers on a nondiscriminatory basis, at a
specified time.
Question I can then be illustrated by reference to the PTA paths I-IV. Thus, PTA' s may
improve welfare immediately, in the static
sense, or reduce it. In either case, the time-path
could then be stagnant (as with time-paths II
and ill), implying a fragmentation of the world
economy through no further expansion of the
initial PTA. Alternatively, it can lead (as in
time-paths I and IV) to multilateral free trade
for all at U* through continued expansion and
coalescence of the PTA's. Under "process
multilateralism'' (i.e., MTN as a multilateral
process of reducing trade barriers as distinct
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from multilateralism as the goal desired), the
time-path may fail to reach U* and instead fall
short at Um because of free-rider problems.
As indicated, if the PTA and MTN timepaths are interdependent, we can address
Question Il. In that case, the MTN time-path
becomes a function of whether the PTA timepath is traveled simultaneously.
The dynamic time-path question has arisen,
just as the static one did, in policy concerns
and political decisions that ran ahead of the
theory. It arose in the context of the U.S. failure to get an MTN round started at the GAIT
in 1982 and the U.S. decision finally to abandon its avoidance of Article XXIV sanctioned
PTA's. This was Hobson's choice: if the MTN
could not be used to continue lowering trade
barriers, then PTA's would need to be used
instead.
But the United States has wound up becoming committed to ''walking on both legs,'' embracing both the PTA and the MTN paths; and
its spokesmen have implied that PTA's will
have a beneficial impact through induced acceleration of MTN. The questions that we have
distinguished above spring therefore from this
shift in U.S. policy. In Bhagwati (1991, 1993),
the challenge to international-trade theorists
(to analyze these questions) was first identified
and a preliminary set of arguments offered.
We now systematize the theoretical literature
that has developed subsequently.

85

Krugman (1991 ), where again the expansion
of membership is treated as exogenously specified, as in Viner (1950), and the world welfare
consequences of the world's mechanically
dividing into a steadily increasing number
of symmetric blocs are examined. Srinivasan
(1993) has critiqued the specific conclusions
as reversible when symmetry is dropped. But
the main problem is the apparent irrelevance
of this approach to the incentive-structure dynamic time-path questions that are of central
importance today.

C. "Endogenously Determined" TimePaths: Recent Theoretical Analyses
The analysis of the dynamic time-path
question has moved into formal politicaleconomy-theoretic modeling. We provide here
a synoptic review of the few significant contributions to date, organizing the literature
analytically in light of the two questions distinguished above.

1. Kemp-Wan.-The approach of Kemp'
and Wan (1976) seems to be pertinent to our
questions but is not. Evidently, the PTA timepath to U* in Figure 1 can be made monotonic,
provided the expanding membership of a PTA
always satisfies the Kemp-Wan rule for forming a CU. But what this argument does not say,
and indeed cannot say, is that the PTA will
necessarily expand in this Kemp-Wan fashion.

Question I. - The single contribution that
focuses on Question I (i.e., the incentive to add
members to a PTA) is by Richard Baldwin
(1993), who concentrates, in turn, on the incentive of nonmembers to join the PTA. He
constructs a model to demonstrate that this incentive will be positive: the PTA will create a
"domino" effect, with outsiders wanting to
become insiders. The argument is basically
driven by the fact that the PTA implies a loss
of cost-competitiveness by imperfectly competitive nonmember firms whose profits in the
PTA markets decline because they must face
the tariffs that member countries' firms do not
have to pay. These firms then lobby for entry,
tilting the political equilibrium at the margin
toward entry demands in their countries. The
countries closest to the margin will then enter
the bloc, assuming that the members have
open entry, thus enlarging the market and
thereby increasing the cost of nonmembership
and pulling in countries at the next margin.
Given the assumptions, including continuity,
this domino model can take the PTA time-path
to U* in Figure 1.

2. Krugman. - The same argument applies
to the theoretical approach introduced by

Question II. -The rest of the theoretical contributions address Question II (i.e.,

B. "Exogenously Determined" Time-Paths:
A Diversion
First, consider theoretical approaches which
are not meaningful for thinking about the dynamic time-path questions at hand.

Copyright© 2001 All Rights Reserved
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whether the PTA possibility or time-path
helps or harms the MTN time-path. Here,
the two major analyses to date addressed
directly and quite aptly to this question,
by Krishna (1995) and Philip Levy (1994),
reach the "malign-impact" conclusion.
Krishna models the political process in the
fashion of the government acting as a "clearing house" in response to implicit lobbying
by firms. His oligopolistic-competition model
shows that the, PfA reduces the incentive of
the two member countries to liberalize tariffs
reciprocally with the nonmember world and
that, with sufficient trade diversion, this
incentive could be so reduced as to make impossible an initially feasible multilateral trade
liberalization.
Levy, who models the political process instead using a median-voter model, works with
scale economies and product variety to demonstrate that bilateral FfA's can. undermine
political support for multilateral free trade. At
the same time, a benign impact is impossible
in this model: if a multilateral free-trade proposal is not feasible under autarky, the same
multilateral proposal cannot be rendered feasible under any bilateral FfA.
The Krishna and Levy models therefore
throw light on the incentive-structure questions at hand when the agents are the lobbying groups and interests that are affected
by different policy options. However, there
are contributions, including that by Kyle
Bagwell and Robert Staiger (1993), that
take the conventional view of governments
as agents maximizing social welfare but
then ask whether the effect of allowing
PTA's to form affects outcomes concerning trade policy relating to the multilateral
system.
In conclusion, among the as-yet-unformalized
arguments that drive the simultaneous use
of PTA's by the United States alongside
multilateralism, ·is that produced by Bhagwati
(1994) who posits a "selfish hegemon" that,
while wedded to multilateral outcomes, uses
the PTA approach as a sequential bargaining
strategy to divide the nonhegemonic governments and improve the final multilateral outcome in favor of its own demands. Koichi
Hamada (1995) has analyzed theoretically the
differential (static) implications of the classic

Charles Kindleberger (1981) "altruistic hegemon" and the Bhagwati (1994) "selfish
hegemon'' theses.
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